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During this Survey period,1 the Texas Supreme Court clarified that the
“fully adversarial trial” requirement established in State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Gandy2 requires that the insured bear an actual risk of
liability for the damages awarded against it or agreed upon to be binding
upon its insurer. The supreme Court also evaluated whether an insured
can recover policy benefits as “damages” for an insurer’s violation of the
Texas Insurance Code, absent evidence that the insured had a contractual
right to benefits under the policy. In seeking to “clarify” precedent, the
supreme court established “five rules addressing the relationship between
contract claims under an insurance policy and tort claims under the Insur-
ance Code.”3 The Texas legislature also made significant legislative
changes to the Texas Insurance Code with the passage of House Bill 1774
and promulgation of Chapter 542A of the Texas Insurance Code. The
new statutes modify an insurer’s liability for certain first-party weather-
related loses under the Insurance Code. In addition to addressing extra-
contractual claims, Texas state and federal courts also evaluated various
contractual issues, including the extent of an insurer’s subrogation rights,
scope of “personal and advertising injury” under a commercial general
liability policy, and coverage for additional insureds.
II. THE “FULLY ADVERSARIAL TRIAL” REQUIREMENT
In Great American Insurance Co. v. Hamel, the Texas Supreme Court
revisited its decision in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Gandy4 to de-
termine whether an underlying judgment against an insured was the re-
sult of a “fully adversarial trial.”5 The underlying case stemmed from
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1. This article encompasses opinions issued between December 1, 2016, and Novem-
ber 30, 2017.
2. 925 S.W.2d 696, 714 (Tex. 1996).
3. USAA Texas Lloyds Company v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479, 484 (Tex. 2018) (The
cited opinion was substituted for an earlier opinion which was published during this Survey
period).
4. 925 S.W.2d 696, 714 (Tex. 1996).
5. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Hamel, 525 S.W.3d 655, 658 (Tex. 2017).
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water damage allegedly caused by the improper installation of exterior
stucco on a home owned by Glen and Marsha Hamel (the Hamels).6 The
Hamels hired Terry Mitchell Builders, Inc. (Mitchell Builders) to finish
construction of their home after the initial contractor abandoned the pro-
ject.7 Mitchell Builders was insured under multiple commercial general
liability policies issued by Great American Insurance Company (Great
American).8 After noticing signs of water damage to their home, the
Hamels sued Mitchell Builders, alleging that the water damage was at-
tributable to either improper construction or, alternatively, the home’s
exterior stucco.9
Mitchell Builders notified Great American of the suit, but Great
American denied coverage, citing an exclusion in the policy.10 Shortly
before the trial, Mitchell Builders entered into a Rule 11 agreement with
the Hamels, which restricted the Hamels’ right to recover only to those
assets in the company’s name (except for the owner’s truck and tools) in
exchange for Mitchell Builders’ agreement to appear at the scheduled
trial and not request a continuance.11 As Mitchell Builders had no other
assets, the net effect of this agreement was to restrict recovery to the
Great American policy proceeds. The day before trial, Mitchell Builders
and the Hamels executed stipulations of fact wherein Mitchell Builders
abandoned its defenses that the water damage resulted from defective
work by the original contractor and instead conceded that Mitchell Build-
ers had failed to properly inspect and repair its defective work.12 After a
brief bench trial, the court awarded the Hamels $365,089 in damages.13
Mitchell Builders then “assigned most of its rights against Great Ameri-
can to the Hamels.”14 A subsequent coverage action against Great Amer-
ican resulted in a judgment for the Hamels of $355,838.15 Great
American appealed, citing State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Gandy16 as
authority for the proposition that judgments issued in favor of an in-
sured’s assignee are not enforceable against an insurer absent a fully ad-
versarial trial.17 In particular, Great American argued that the appellate
court erred in finding that the bench trial satisfied the “fully adversarial
trial” requirement as required by Gandy.18
In evaluating Great American’s appeal, the supreme court sought to
harmonize its previous holdings in Employers Casualty Co. v. Block,19




10. Id. at 659–60.
11. Id. at 660.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 661.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 662.
16. 925 S.W.2d 696, 714 (Tex. 1996).
17. Hamel, 525 S.W.3d at 662.
18. Id. at 662, 665–66.
19. 744 S.W.2d 940, 942–43 (Tex. 1988).
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Gandy,20 and Evanston Ins. Co. v. ATOFINA Petrochemicals, Inc.21
Whereas the court in Block had adopted the reasoning that an insurer’s
breach of its duty to defend rendered any resulting judgment binding
against the insurer, Gandy and ATOFINA both focused their analysis on
whether “the underlying judgment accurately reflect[ed] the plaintiff’s
damages.”22
Initially, the supreme court cautioned that in evaluating whether there
was a “fully adversarial trial,” an appellate court should not second guess
trial strategy, as this “often produces an inaccurate and unreliable re-
sult.”23 In particular, “[e]very trial presents unique challenges, requiring
subjective judgment calls that may seem in hindsight to have been ill-
advised. But determining whether and when those calls destroy the ‘ad-
versarial’ nature of the proceeding is simply not possible.”24 Instead, the
supreme court held that “the controlling factor is whether, at the time of
the underlying trial or settlement, the insured bore an actual risk of liabil-
ity for the damages awarded or agreed upon” or, otherwise, had some
incentive to seek an accurate judgment.25 The supreme court stated that
this holding is consistent with its decision in ATOFINA. Applying this
principle to the facts in Hamel, the supreme court noted that the pretrial
agreement not to enforce any judgment against the personal assets of
Mitchell Builders removed all incentive for the insured to defend itself at
trial.26 As a result, the supreme court held that an adversarial defect in
the underlying trial could be remedied by a fully adversarial insurance
trial, but that had not taken place in the case at bar.27
The supreme court also found that the determination of the actual
damages suffered by the Hamels was not addressed in the coverage litiga-
tion at the trial or appellate level.28 Accordingly, the court determined
that the proper remedy under the circumstances was to remand the mat-
ter for a new insurance trial, which would provide both the Hamels and
Great American with an opportunity to litigate whether and to what ex-
tent Mitchell Builders had covered liability.29
In our 2015 article, we recognized that litigation and uncertainty ex-
isted in Texas regarding the scope and interplay among Block, Gandy,
and ATOFINA. Although some commentators interpreted ATOFINA as
overruling or limiting Gandy, we suggested that ATOFINA did not over-
rule Gandy and that the two opinions were not in conflict. ATOFINA
was distinguishable from Gandy because, in ATOFINA, the insured paid
the settlement amount and brought suit against its insurer to recover the
20. 925 S.W.2d 696, 714 (Tex. 1996).
21. 256 S.W.3d 660, 673–74 (Tex. 2008).
22. Hamel, 525 S.W.3d at 665.
23. Id. at 666.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 667.
27. Id. at 669.
28. Id. at 670.
29. Id. at 671.
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amount it actually paid. Gandy, on the other hand, involved an agreed
judgment and assignment of rights, pursuant to which the insured had no
obligation to pay the amount of the agreed judgment. Further, in Gandy,
the underlying plaintiff—as the insured’s assignee—sued the insurer to
recover the agreed amount.
In Hamel, the Texas Supreme Court expressly confirmed that the hold-
ings from Gandy and ATOFINA can be harmonized. Thus, remaining in
effect is the rule in Gandy that “[i]n no event . . . is a judgment for plain-
tiff against defendant, rendered without a fully adversarial trial, binding
on defendant’s insurer or admissible as evidence of damages in an action
against defendant’s insurer by plaintiff as defendant’s assignee.”30 How-
ever, pursuant to ATOFINA, this rule is tempered by the equitable prin-
ciple of estoppel. To date, the only recognized basis to estop an insurer
from contesting the amount of a settlement is when the insurer refused to
participate in settlement negotiations and the insured incurs actual liabil-
ity for payment of the settlement. Although Hamel answered the ques-
tions as to whether ATOFINA overruled Gandy in the negative, we
anticipate that litigation will continue regarding whether and to what ex-
tent Gandy should be further limited.
III. EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
A. CHAPTER 541 AND THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH
AND FAIR DEALING
Insurers have argued that an insured is prohibited from recovering ex-
tra-contractual damages under Chapter 541 of the Texas Insurance Code
(Chapter 541) absent the insured demonstrating it sustained an “indepen-
dent injury” separate and apart from the loss of the policy benefits. In
USAA Texas Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, the Texas Supreme Court appears
to have rejected this broad “independent injury” prerequisite to bringing
a claim under Chapter 541. Rather, in an attempt to clarify years of what
it admits was confusing precedent, the supreme court promulgated five
rules for evaluating when an insured can recover statutory extra-contrac-
tual damages from an insurer.31
After her home was struck by Hurricane Ike, Gail Menchaca
(Menchaca) filed a claim for coverage with her homeowners’ insurer,
USAA Texas Lloyds (USAA).32 USAA determined that the damage to
Menchaca’s home was covered but did not exceed the policy’s deducti-
ble.33 USAA declined to pay for the damage, and Menchaca sued for
breach of the insurance policy and violations of the Texas Insurance
Code, claiming as damages the benefits due under the policy plus court
costs and attorney’s fees.34 The jury determined that USAA complied
30. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Gandy, 925 S.W.2d 696, 714 (Tex. 1996).
31. USAA Texas Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479, 484 (Tex. 2018).
32. Id. at 484–86.
33. Id. at 485.
34. Id. at 485–86.
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with the terms of the policy, but that it failed to pay a claim without con-
ducting a reasonable investigation in violation of the Insurance Code. The
jury calculated Menchaca’s damages based on what it believed USAA
should have paid under the policy.35 According to USAA, “Menchaca
could not recover for ‘bad faith or extra-contractual liability as a matter
of law’” because the jury found that USAA had not breached the
policy.36
On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court acknowledged that both USAA
and Menchaca could cite precedent in their favor: Provident American
Insurance Co. v. Castan˜eda37 for USAA; Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mu-
tual Insurance Co.38 for Menchaca.39 Recognizing that courts and com-
mentators had opined that these decisions potentially stood at odds with
one another, the supreme court explained that the case at bar “presents
an opportunity to provide clarity regarding the relationship between
claims for an insurance-policy breach and Insurance Code violations. In
light of the confusing nature of our precedent in this area, we begin by
returning to the underlying governing principles.”40 According to the su-
preme court, the initial underlying governing principle “is that an ‘insur-
ance policy is a contract’ that establishes the respective rights and
obligations to which an insurer and its insured have mutually agreed.”41
However, an insurance contract presents unique circumstances, “because
an insurer generally ‘has exclusive control over the evaluation, process-
ing[,] and denial of claims,’ and it can easily use that control to take ad-
vantage of its insured.”42 Thus, according to the supreme court, there is
justification for imposing a common law duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing upon an insurer. The second principle is that Chapter 541 imposes
certain statutory requirements in addition to common law requirements
under which an insurer must “review and resolve an insured’s claim for
policy benefits.”43 While a claim for breach of the policy is distinct and
independent from claims that an insurer breached its extra-contractual
common law and statutory duties, the supreme court recognized that
these are “largely interwoven.”44 Thus, “[t]he primary question in this
case [was] whether an insured can recover policy benefits as actual dam-
ages caused by an insurer’s statutory violation absent a finding that the
insured had a contractual right to the benefits under the insurance
policy.”45
35. Id. at 486.
36. Id.
37. 988 S.W.2d 189, 198 (Tex. 1998).
38. 754 S.W.2d 129, 136 (Tex. 1988).
39. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d at 487.
40. Id. at 488.
41. Id. (quoting RSUI Indem. Co. v. The Lynd Co., 466 S.W.3d 113, 118 (Tex. 2015)).
42. Id. (quoting Arnold v. Nat’l Cty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex.
1987)).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 489.
45. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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To address this question, the supreme court set forth “five distinct but
interrelated rules that govern the relationship between contractual and
extra-contractual claims in the insurance context.”46 “First, as a general
rule, an insured cannot recover policy benefits as damages for an insurer’s
statutory violation” if the insured does not have a right to those benefits
under the policy.47 Citing the language of the Insurance Code itself, the
supreme court observed that an insured may recover actual damages only
if “caused by” the insurer’s statutory violation. Explaining further, the
supreme court stated that, in general, if an insurer violates a statutory
provision, that violation cannot cause damages in the form of policy bene-
fits that the insured has no right to receive under the policy.48
The second rule outlined by the supreme court is the “Entitled-to-Ben-
efits” Rule: “An insured who establishes a right to receive benefits under
the insurance policy can recover those benefits as actual damages under
the Insurance Code if the insurer’s statutory violation causes the loss of
the benefits.”49 This rule reconciles Castan˜eda, Republic Insurance Co. v.
Stoker, and Vail:
In short, Stoker and Castan˜eda stand for the general rule that an in-
sured cannot recover policy benefits as damages for an insurer’s ex-
tra-contractual violation if the policy does not provide the insured a
right to those benefits. Vail announced a corollary rule: an insured
who establishes a right to benefits under the policy can recover those
benefits as actual damages resulting from a statutory violation.50
In other words, the insured is not limited to breach of contract damages
for the policy benefits. Those contractual benefits can constitute actual
damages under Chapter 541 if the damages resulted from an insurer en-
gaging in conduct that constitutes a statutory violation. Thus, if the in-
surer breaches the insurance policy by engaging in conduct that
constitutes a statutory violation, the insured can recover its contractual
benefits as “damages” under Chapter 541. For example, this occurs when
an insurer wrongfully denies a claim without proper investigation or fails
to settle a claim when liability is reasonably clear.
The third rule is the “Benefits-Lost Rule.” Under this rule, “even if the
insured cannot establish a present contractual right to policy benefits, the
insured can recover benefits as actual damages under the Insurance Code
if the insurer’s statutory violation caused the insured to lose that contrac-
tual right.”51 For instance, if an insurer misrepresents that the policy pro-
vides coverage when the policy actually does not provide coverage, the
insurer can be liable under the statute for benefits to the extent that the
insured is adversely affected or injured by its reliance on the insurer’s





50. Id. at 497.
51. Id. at 489 (emphasis added).
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sured, the insurer may be estopped from denying benefits. The amount
the insured can recover based on estoppel could be “actual damages” if
the conduct creating the estoppel constitutes a violation of the statute.
As a fourth rule, the supreme court stated that “if an insurer’s statutory
violation causes an injury independent of the loss of policy benefits, the
insured may recover damages for that injury even if the policy does not
grant the insured a right to benefits.”52 This rule has two aspects. First, “if
an insurer’s statutory violation causes an injury independent of the in-
sured’s right to recover policy benefits, the insured may recover damages
for that injury even if the policy does not entitle the insured to receive
benefits.”53 Second, “an insurer’s statutory violation does not permit the
insured to recover any damages beyond policy benefits unless the viola-
tion causes an injury that is independent from the loss of the benefits.”54
Finally, under the fifth rule, which the supreme court explained is the
“No-Recovery Rule,” an insured cannot recover any damages based on
an insurer’s statutory violation if the insured had no right to receive bene-
fits under the policy and sustained no injury independent of a right to
benefits.55 The supreme court stated that this rule is “simply the natural
corollary to the first four rules.”56
In light of this framework, the supreme court held that remand was
proper “in the interest of justice” given the confusing nature of the legal
precedent.57 Interestingly, the supreme court recognized that due to the
confusion of the prior legal opinions, both parties had relied on incom-
plete analyses of statutory liability.58
The goal of the supreme court was to establish a clear framework for
both insurers and insureds as to the application of the Texas Insurance
Code. Even though the supreme court explicitly sought “to clarify”59 pre-
cedent with five rules, whether it was able to provide actual clarification
to the insurance bar remains to be seen and will likely involve post-
Menchaca litigation.
B. TEXAS INSURANCE CODE CHAPTER 542 PROCESSING AND
SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS (CHAPTER 542)
In Mainali Corp. v. Covington Specialty Insurance Co., the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit evaluated whether an insurer who timely
pays an appraisal award is subject to extra-contractual penalties under
the Prompt Payment of Claims Act.60 A fire damaged a gas station
owned by Mainali Corp (Mainali) and insured by Covington Specialty
52. Id.
53. Id. at 499.
54. Id. at 500.
55. Id. at 500–01.
56. Id. at 500.
57. Id. at 521.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 489.
60. Mainali Corp. v. Covington Specialty Ins. Co., 872 F.3d 255, 257 (5th Cir. 2017).
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Insurance Company (Covington).61 After Mainali reported the incident
and requested coverage, Covington sent an independent adjuster to in-
spect the risk.62 Over the course of the next six months, Covington paid
Mainali installments totaling $389,255.59, representing the “actual cash
value” for the loss.63 Mainali disputed Covington’s loss calculations, and
two months after the final payment, filed suit against Covington and its
adjuster.64 Covington removed the suit to federal court and invoked its
right to an appraisal under the policy.65 The appraisal panel issued an
appraisal award of $387,925.49, “inclusive of all FIRE damages sustained
to the insured property.”66 According to the Fifth Circuit, “[a]lthough
Covington had already paid more than the total amount the appraisal
panel said it owed, [Covington] paid an additional $15,175.82 for the
building allocation after the panel announced its award.”67
Covington moved for summary judgment after the announcement of
the award on the basis that its timely payment of the appraisal precluded
Mainali’s contract and extra-contractual claims. In response, Mainali ar-
gued that the appraisal award was incomplete because it did not account
for certain covered damages. Mainali further contended that Covington
owed interest penalties under Chapter 542 because the appraisal payment
was made more than sixty days after Covington had received necessary
documentation for which to evaluate the claim.68 The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of Covington and Mainali appealed.
The Fifth Circuit noted the strong presumption under Texas law in
favor of the validity of appraisal awards except in circumstances where
the award was either made without authority, resulted from fraud or acci-
dent, or was otherwise “not in compliance with the requirements of the
policy.”69 Reasoning that the award stated that it was inclusive of all fire
damages sustained at the property, the court observed that Mainali failed
to meet its burden to show some evidence that the appraisal award was
incomplete.70
The court then turned to Mainali’s claim that the appraisal award
should be subject to statutory interest for prompt payment violations, ex-
plaining that
under Chapter 542 of the Texas Insurance Code . . . the statute re-
quires the insurer to pay the policyholder’s claim within 60 days of
receiving all documentation needed to resolve the claim. If the in-








68. Id. at 257–58.
69. Id. at 258.
70. Id.
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that was not timely paid, plus attorney’s fees.71
The court observed: “[w]e must decide whether a payment made to com-
ply with an appraisal award, which in most if not all cases is going to be
paid after the 60-day window, is subject to this penalty. No reported
Texas case has ever subjected such a payment to the statute.”72
Mainali cited one case in support of its prompt payment claims, Graber
v. State Farm Lloyds.73 However, the Fifth Circuit noted that ample au-
thority exists that timely payment of an appraisal award precludes statu-
tory penalties.74 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that “[t]he most
fundamental problem with Graber is that it did not recognize [a court’s
Erie] duty to follow state courts’ interpretation of state law rather than
the interpretation the federal court thinks makes the most sense.”75 Ac-
cording to the court, “the primary authority Graber relied on was the
rejection of a ‘good faith’ defense to the Prompt Payment of Claims Act
in a nonappraisal case.”76 In sum, the court found:
The different situation in which that ruling [in Graber] arose is not
enough to divine that the Supreme Court of Texas would disagree
with all the lower courts in the state that have addressed the issue in
the context of postappraisal payments. Covington was not trying to
avoid payment of the claim; it was invoking a contractually agreed to
mechanism for assessing the amount it owed.77
As a result, the Fifth Circuit determined that Covington satisfied the stat-
utory prompt payment requirement as set forth in Chapter 542 of the
Texas Insurance Code and was therefore not subject to statutory penal-
ties because Covington timely paid the appraisal award.78
If an insurer and insured cannot reach an agreement regarding the
value of a covered loss, the appraisal provision generally provides a
mechanism for determination of an agreed valuation. As shown by the
holding in Mainali, if an insurer timely pays an appraisal award, the in-
sured would promptly receive the benefits to which the insured is entitled
under the policy. This holding comports with the purpose of Chapter 542,
which is to “promote the prompt payment of insurance claims,” pursuant
to policies of insurance.79
71. Id. (citing TEX. INS. CODE § 542.060 (West Supp. 2017)).
72. Id.
73. 2015 WL 3755030, at *10 (N.D. Tex. June 15, 2015) (mem. op).
74. Mainali Corp., 872 F.3d at 258–59.




79. TEX. INS. CODE § 542.054 (West 2009 & Supp. 2017).
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IV. CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
A. COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY (CGL) INSURANCE
In Longhorn Gasket & Supply Co. v. United States Fire Insurance Co.,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit evaluated whether asbes-
tos qualified as a “pollutant” under a CGL policy. Longhorn manufac-
tured and sold gaskets which contained asbestos during the 1980s and
1990s and was consequently the defendant in a number of asbestos liabil-
ity lawsuits.80 Trinity Lloyd’s Insurance Company and Trinity Universal
Insurance Company (collectively, Trinity) were the primary insurers dur-
ing the period at issue and had expended considerable sums both in de-
fending and settling a number of the claims.81 In 2007, Longhorn filed suit
against its excess insurer, U.S. Fire, for breach of contract and insurance
code violations arising out of U.S. Fire’s denial of coverage.82 Trinity in-
tervened in the lawsuit, contending that it had exhausted the limits of the
primary policy and seeking reimbursement from U.S. Fire for defense and
indemnity costs paid on behalf of Longhorn.83 Before the case was con-
cluded, Longhorn settled with U.S. Fire, and dismissed its claims with
prejudice.84 A district court ultimately determined that Trinity was enti-
tled to $903,638.52 in settlement costs and an additional $1,564,334.47 in
defenses costs from U.S. Fire.85
U.S. Fire appealed, arguing that the district court had erred in a num-
ber of its rulings.86 The Fifth Circuit, however, focused on the application
of the pollution exclusion in the U.S. Fire policy.87 Specifically, the policy
contained an exclusion that barred coverage for the “discharge, dispersal,
release or escape” of “irritant[s], contaminant[s] or pollutant[s],” but it
did not apply “if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden
and accidental.”88 The parties differed on whether asbestos could be a
“pollutant” under the exclusion, and the Fifth Circuit noted that there
was no dispositive ruling by the Texas Supreme Court on the matter.89
Surveying other jurisdictions, the Fifth Circuit noted that the case law
“slightly favor[ed]” treating asbestos as a pollutant, particularly where, as
with the U.S. Fire policy, coverage was excluded for “irritant[s], contami-
nant[s] or pollutant[s].”90 The court went on to observe that asbestos also
apparently satisfied the plain language meaning of irritant as anything
“causing irritation; esp. physical irritation.”91 Accordingly, the court held
80. Longhorn Gasket & Supply Co. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 698 F. App’x 774, 775 (5th




84. Id. at 776.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 776–77.
87. Id. at 778–79.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 779.
90. Id. at 780.
91. Id. at 779.
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that U.S. Fire had met its burden in establishing that asbestos triggered
the exclusion in its policy and remanded the case to the district court for
further determination of whether the exclusion’s “sudden and accidental”
exception applied.92
B. PROPERTY INSURANCE
In Nassar v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., the Texas Supreme
Court evaluated whether a fence attached to a home falls within the
scope of dwelling coverage under a homeowners’ insurance policy.93 Hur-
ricane Ike damaged the Nassars’ home and fence, prompting the Nassars
to file a claim with their homeowners’ insurer, Liberty Mutual.94 The pol-
icy included both “dwelling” coverage, with a $247,200 limit, and an
“other structures” coverage subject to a much lower limit of $24,720.95
The damage to the home totaled $20,090.61, while damage to the fencing
alone totaled $58,665.96 As a result, a dispute arose between Liberty Mu-
tual and the Nassars regarding whether the damage to the fence fell
within the “dwelling” or “other structures” coverage of the policy.
The supreme court agreed with the Nassars that, under the policy
terms, the fence was covered as part of the dwelling. While the policy did
not define what constitutes a “structure,” the policy did indicate that
“dwelling” includes structures attached to it.97 Citing the Black’s Law
Dictionary definition of a “structure” as “[a]ny construction, production,
or piece of work artificially built up or composed of parts purposefully
joined together” and “attach” as “[t]o annex, bind, or fasten,” the su-
preme court held that the policy language was unambiguous and that the
fence, which was either bolted or cemented onto the house, was clearly a
structure attached to the house.98 The supreme court rejected the analysis
of the appellate court and arguments by Liberty Mutual that such a read-
ing of the policy might allow for ambiguity.99 Rather, the supreme court
opined that to have read the policy otherwise would have been to make
an impermissible guess about the intent of the policy’s drafters as op-
posed to a determination based on the plain language of the contract.100
C. COMMERCIAL CRIME INSURANCE
In Cooper Industries, Ltd. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pitts-
burgh, Pennsylvania, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit eval-
uated whether a commercial crime policy provides coverage for pension
fund assets invested in what was later determined to be a Ponzi
92. Id. at 781.
93. Nassar v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 508 S.W.3d 254, 258 (Tex. 2017) (per curiam).
94. Id. at 255.
95. Id. at 256.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 258.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 258–59.
100. Id. at 260.
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scheme.101 Cooper Industries (Cooper) was a publicly traded company
and offered a pension plan to its employees. Cooper contracted with and
“invested more than $140 million of its equity-fund assets and $35 million
of its bond-fund assets” through Westridge Capital Management and its
two related companies (collectively the Westridge Entities).102
It was later discovered that the Westridge Entities were running a
Ponzi scheme. After government regulators filed an enforcement action
against the Westridge Entities, a receiver was appointed to collect and
liquidate whatever assets remained in the Westridge Entities. The re-
ceiver ultimately determined that each investor in the Ponzi scheme was
entitled to return of approximately eighty-five percent of its net invest-
ment. After Cooper obtained a distribution from the receiver, it submit-
ted to its commercial crime insurer National Union Fire Insurance
Company of Pittsburgh (National Union) “a proof of loss, estimating that
it could ultimately experience a loss of between $15 million and $57 mil-
lion.”103 National Union denied coverage and Cooper filed suit in federal
district court.
The policy issued by National Union provided coverage for loss of
funds resulting from fraudulent or dishonest acts, but limited coverage to
property that was owned or leased by the insured.104 The policy also con-
tained exclusions that barred coverage for loss that resulted from trading
and indirect loss that resulted from an occurrence.105 The district court
entered a take-nothing judgment against Cooper, explaining first that
“Cooper did not ‘own’ its lost earnings within the meaning of the Policy,”
and second, “that Cooper suffered no ‘loss’ under the Policy when it
loaned funds to [the Westridge Entities] because it gave up ownership of
the principal at the moment it made the loan.”106
On appeal, Cooper argued that it owned the lost principal and interest
it had invested with the Westridge Entities.107 The Fifth Circuit rejected
this argument, noting that although the word “own” was not defined in
the policy, under its common meaning “own” implied some level of pos-
session or control.108 Rather, the Fifth Circuit explained that when
Cooper invested the pension funds with the Westridge Entities, it gave up
possession or control of the funds in exchange for promissory notes.109
While Cooper cited to cases where courts had construed the term “own”
to include a more equitable definition of ownership, the Fifth Circuit ob-
served that in insurance disputes like the one before the court, the gen-
eral trend was to adopt the everyday meaning of the term rather than a
101. Cooper Indus., Ltd. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Penn., 876 F.3d 119,
123 (5th Cir. 2017).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 125.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 125–26.
107. Id. at 128.
108. Id. at 129.
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legalistic interpretation.110
Cooper also argued that it had suffered a “loss” under the policy when
it transferred the fund principal to the Westridge Entities.111 The court
noted: “[a]ccording to Cooper, a ‘loss’ occurs at the moment a borrower
fraudulently induces a loan.”112 The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument
as well, reasoning that while loss was not defined in the policy, it gener-
ally required “some action which reduced the available assets . . . as
against its liabilities to depositors, creditors, and stockholders.”113 The
court concluded:
Whether Cooper is entitled to recover the principal depends on
whether a “loss” occurred before or after title passed to [the Wes-
tridge Entities’ agents]. Under Texas law, a fraudulently induced
loan is voidable, not void. [citations omitted]. Even though [the Wes-
tridge Entities’ agents] procured the loan through fraud, title to the
funds still passed to [the Westridge Entities]. [citations omitted]. The
“loss,” however, did not occur when Cooper loaned the funds to [the
Westridge Entities], but when [the Westridge Entities’ agents] stole
them after the loan had been made. By that time, title had passed,
and Cooper no longer owned the funds. Moreover, Cooper’s sub-
stantial profit on its equity-fund investment belies any argument that
it sustained a “loss” when it funded the loan. Cooper ultimately re-
covered all of its equity-fund principal, as well as roughly $30 million
in earnings. It makes no sense to say that it nonetheless suffered a
“loss” of the principal when it funded the loan because the loan actu-
ally yielded a substantial profit for Cooper. Cooper may have ulti-
mately earned less on the equity-fund investment than it would have
had it invested with honest money managers, but that opportunity
cost is a purely theoretical loss not covered by the Policy.114
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held that Cooper was “not entitled to
recover its principal investment because it did not suffer a ‘loss’ of that
principal [amount] until after title had passed to [the Westridge
Entities].”115
V. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
A. DUTY TO DEFEND AND DUTY TO INDEMNIFY
1. Fifth Circuit Evaluates the Meaning of “Advertising Idea” Under
Coverage B of a CGL Policy
In Laney Chiropractic & Sports Therapy, P.A. v. Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered
whether an insured’s advertisement of another’s product triggered a duty
to defend under a policy which provided coverage for use of another’s
110. Id. at 130.
111. Id. at 131.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 131–32.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 132.
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advertising idea, trade dress infringement, or slogan infringement.116 Be-
ginning in 2004, Laney provided “Active Release Techniques” (ART)
treatments to customers under a licensing agreement with ART Corpo-
rate Solutions, Inc. and Active Release Technologies, LLC.117 By 2011, it
was offering these services directly to customers with no licensing agree-
ment, while still referring to ART on its website.118 In 2014, Laney
changed its website to describe “soft tissue techniques,” or “STT,” and
“500 unique deep tissues protocols,” which was language used by the
ART companies to describe their treatments.119 Thereafter, Laney
changed its website yet again, describing its treatments as a “Fascial Dis-
tortion Model,” or “FDM,” but retained the same verbiage as its previous
description of ART licensed techniques.120 The ART companies sued La-
ney for “trademark infringement, false and/or misleading advertising, de-
ceptive business practices, unfair competition, breach of contract, and
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.”121 Laney sought cover-
age under Coverage B of its CGL policy from Nationwide.122 Nationwide
denied coverage on the basis that the allegations in the underlying plead-
ing failed to trigger the insuring agreement. In a subsequent declaratory
judgment action brought by Laney, a trial court agreed with Nationwide
that there was no coverage and Laney appealed to the Fifth Circuit.123
On appeal, Laney argued that the ART suit was one for “personal and
advertising injury,” which the policy defined, in relevant part, as either
the use of another’s “advertising idea” in your “advertisement” or “in-
fringing upon another’s copyright, trade dress or slogan in your ‘adver-
tisement.’”124 The court rejected this argument. The court first
recognized that the policy does not define the term “advertising idea.”
Moreover, neither the Fifth Circuit nor Texas state courts have evaluated
what that term means in the context of a commercial general liability
policy. However, other jurisdictions have examined that term and found
that under the plain and ordinary meaning, an “advertising idea” is some-
thing used as a marketing or advertising device.125 Accordingly, the court
found that the allegations regarding the use of ART products in Laney’s
advertisements did not qualify as the use of an “advertising idea.”126 Spe-
cifically, the court found that trademarks are not an advertising idea “be-
cause under Texas law, a trademark is not a marketing or advertising
116. Laney Chiropractic & Sports Therapy, P.A. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 866 F.3d
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device.”127 Thus, because the use of a trademark is not the use of an
advertising idea, “Laney’s use of trademarked phrases, such as ‘ART’ or
‘Active Release Techniques,’ is not the use of another’s advertising
idea.”128 Conflating the two concepts would run afoul of the traditional
distinction between advertisement and the product being advertised.129
The court also rejected Laney’s argument that the underlying com-
plaint potentially stated a trade dress claim. Noting that “trade dress pro-
tection extends only to incidental, arbitrary or ornamental product
features which identify the source of the product,” the court found that
there could be no trade dress claims based on the allegations that Laney
copied ART’s entire products.130 The allegations did not concern any
purely aesthetic aspect of Laney’s advertising or allege any required ele-
ment of a trade dress claim.131 The allegations also did not concern the
look or feel of Laney’s website, but rather that the website used specific
words meant to describe products.132
Finally, the court rejected Laney’s contention that the underlying com-
plaint potentially involved slogan infringement, reasoning that terms al-
legedly used were not slogans, but rather were brand or product
names.133 As with “advertising idea,” the court looked to other jurisdic-
tions for guidance on how to define “slogan” as used in the policy. The
court determined that Laney’s proffered definition was in direct conflict
with the trend of construing “slogan” to be a short catchy phrase.134 Find-
ing that the allegations did not implicate coverage under the policy, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court.
2. Fifth Circuit Evaluates Duty to Defend and Priority of Coverage
Issues Between Co-Insurers
Carothers Construction (Carothers) acted as general contractor for a
project and retained subcontractors Premier Constructors (Premier) and
Self-Concrete.135 United Fire & Casualty Company (United) insured
Self-Concrete; Colony National Insurance Company (Colony) insured
Premier. Both policies identified Carothers as an additional insured.136
Gordon Bonner (Bonner) was employed by Premier and sustained inju-
ries when a tilt wall panel swung out and hit him.137 He sued Carothers,
Premier, one of Premier’s subcontractors, and Self-Concrete.138
127. Id. (citing Sport Supply Grp., Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 335 F.3d 453, 464 (5th Cir.
2003)).
128. Id.
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Carothers tendered a request for defense and indemnity as an additional
insured to both Colony and United. Colony accepted the tender but
United declined.139 After the underlying lawsuit settled, Colony sued
United in subrogation for breach of contract. United also asserted claims
for contribution stemming from United’s refusal to participate in defend-
ing Carothers in the underlying suit.140 Both insurers moved for summary
judgment. The district court held that based upon the factual allegations
in the underlying pleading, United had breached its duty to defend and
was responsible for half of the defense costs.141
United’s policy language required that the additional insured have po-
tential “LIABILITY WHICH MAY BE IMPUTED TO [THE ADDITIONAL IN-
SURED] DIRECTLY ARISING OUT OF [SELF-CONCRETE’S] ONGOING
OPERATIONS PERFORMED FOR [THE ADDITIONAL INSURED].”142 United
argued on appeal that additional insured coverage did not apply because
the underlying pleading contained “no facts or theories that support[ed]
imputed liability” against Carothers.143 In particular, United argued that
the allegations did not implicate Self-Concrete’s scope of work “because
the accident was caused by an out of control tilt wall panel, and the con-
tract between Self-Concrete and Carothers specifically excluded lifting
tilt wall panels from the scope of Self-Concrete’s work.”144
Rejecting this argument, the Fifth Circuit explained that because the
underlying pleading contained allegations
that Carothers retained authority over the jobsite and plans for the
tilt wall panels and further failed to ensure that its subcontractors
abided by the requirements and standards contained in the subcon-
tracts[, t]his [was] sufficient to find liability on the part of Self-Con-
crete, which may be imputed to Carothers, giving rise to a duty to
defend.145
Relying on law developed in the employer/employee context, the court
recognized that an employer is not usually liable for the acts of negli-
gence of an independent contractor. However, the court explained that
such liability may exist if the employer retains control of “operative de-
tails” of the subcontractor’s work.146 The court focused on the specific
allegations by Bonner and held that there was at least the potential that
Carothers maintained “operative control” over the details of Self-Con-




142. Id. at 945.
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145. Id. at 945–46.
146. Id. at 946. According to the court, under applicable Texas law for an employer to
have control of “operative details,” the employer must have “the right to control the
means, methods, or details of the independent contractor’s work to the extent that the
independent contractor is not entirely free to do the work his own way.” Id.
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United’s duty to defend.147 Specifically, the court observed:
Bonner alleged that Carothers provided plans for the tilt wall panel
formation to Self-Concrete. Providing “plans” may be typical of a
general contractor and may not rise to the level of imputing liability
to a general contractor for the purposes of tort liability. However,
Bonner alleged that Carothers’s control over the “plans” included
much more than simply furnishing the plans. Moreover, Bonner’s pe-
tition set forth the detailed level of control that Carothers exercised
over the jobsite and Self-Concrete’s work, which, in addition to fol-
lowing the terms of its contracts, included having the right and duty
to enforce regulations of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, OSHA,
and Carothers’s own Safety Policy/Accident Prevention Plan, which
were incorporated into Carothers and Self-Concrete’s subcontract.
This level of control over Self-Concrete’s actions amounts to “opera-
tive control” . . . .148
Having found that United had a duty to defend Carothers, the court
then considered the issue of priority of coverage between the United pol-
icy and Colony policy. With respect to coverage for additional insureds,
each policy had language that purported to make it excess to the other.
Because these clauses were mutually repugnant, the court found that they
cancelled each other out. As a result, Colony and United were obligated
to share equally the costs of defending Carothers.149 In reaching its hold-
ing, the court specifically rejected United’s argument that the “Primary
and Non-Contributing Insurance Endorsement” in Colony’s policy ne-
gated United’s duty to defend.150
3. Fifth Circuit Evaluates Whether Misrepresentation of Patent Rights
Can Constitute a Coverage B Offense for Purposes of the
Duty to Defend Under CGL Policy
In Uretek (USA), Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., Uretek (USA), Inc.
(Uretek) was a roadway maintenance and repair company insured under
a commercial general liability policy by Continental Casualty Company
(Continental).151 Uretek sued a competitor, Applied Polymerics (Ap-
plied), for patent infringement. In response, Applied filed a counterclaim
against Uretek.152 According to the counterclaim, Uretek:
engaged in a pattern or practice of misrepresenting the scope of
[Uretek’s] patent in a concerted effort to intimidate and coerce
[Uretek’s] competitors into refraining from proper and lawful bid-
ding on, and to intimidate contracting bodies in the selection and
award of bids for, construction projects for which the scope of work
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 947.
150. Id.
151. Uretek (USA), Inc. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 701 F. App’x 343, 344 (5th Cir. 2017) (per
curiam).
152. Id.
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does not involve processes covered by [Uretek’s] Patent.153
Applied alleged that Uretek engaged in its conduct with “knowledge that
[its] patent [was] not valid or enforceable.”154 Applied also asserted in its
counterclaim that it had contracted with the Virginia Department of
Transportation (VDOT) to perform work on Interstate 664, and that
Uretek “falsely misrepresented to general contractors, VDOT, and other
roadway-owning government authorities that the VDOT contract for I-
664 . . . and/or other contracts let for bid are covered by [Uretek’s] pat-
ent.”155 Additionally, Allied alleged in its counterclaim that Uretek’s mis-
representations “deceived or had a tendency to deceive a substantial
segment of Applied’s roadway-owning government authority customers,
general contractor customers, and potential customers and that Allied re-
ceived fewer contracts for pavement lifting work.”156 According to Al-
lied, Uretek “inhibited competition by representing to government
agencies and others that certain pavement lifting work—including work
performed under the VDOT contract—fell within the scope of Uretek’s
. . . patent.”157 Applied also asserted that Uretek violated state unfair
competition law due to its “illegal and anti-competitive acts.”158
Uretek tendered the counterclaim to Continental for coverage.159 Af-
ter Continental denied coverage, Uretek filed a declaratory judgment ac-
tion. The Coverage B insuring agreement in the Continental policy stated,
in relevant part, that Continental would defend Uretek against suits seek-
ing damages for an “injury . . . arising out of . . . [the] [o]ral or written
publication, in any manner, of material that . . . disparages a person’s or
organization’s goods, products or services.”160
The district court granted summary judgment for Continental, finding
that the terms of the Coverage B insuring agreement of the policy were
not triggered. According to the district court, “Allied had not alleged [in
its counterclaim] that Uretek told customers that Applied had infringed
the . . . patent.”161
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed. First, the
court explained that the plain, ordinary, and generally accepted meaning
of disparage is “‘to lower in rank or reputation; degrade’ or ‘speak slight-
ingly about.’”162 After detailed recitation of the factual allegations from
the counterclaim, the court surmised that “[a] statement to a competitor’s
customer that the competitor is undertaking work that it has no legal
right to undertake disparages that competitor and the services it offers by
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clear implication.”163 The Fifth Circuit rejected Uretek’s reliance on
KLN Steel Products Co. v. CNA Insurance Cos., in which the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that an insurer had no duty to defend
where the insured allegedly overstated its qualifications in conversation
with contracting officers.164 The court noted that while KLN involved the
insured overstating its qualifications to a potential customer, Applied’s
counterclaim involved actual disparagement of a competitor’s work.165
The court also rejected Continental’s argument that the suit needed to
consist of a “covered disparagement offense”—specifically business dis-
paragement—reiterating that absent a definition of the term “disparage-
ment” in the policy, it would rely on the commonly understood meaning
of the word.166 The court also determined that two of the policy’s exclu-
sions, which barred coverage for material published with knowledge of its
falsity or for injury caused with knowledge that the act would inflict per-
sonal and advertising injury, were inapplicable as Applied’s counterclaim
merely alleged that Uretek “knew or should have known” that its patent
did not prevent its competitors from bidding on public contracts.167 The
court recognized that the Lanham Act does not require intentional con-
duct. Accordingly, the court found that the duty to defend was triggered
because Applied could at least potentially prevail on its claims based on
its factual allegations in the counterclaim.168
B. NOTICE CONDITION
A frequent topic of coverage litigation is whether the notice provision
of an insurance policy provides an insurer a basis to deny coverage if an
insured fails to provide timely notice of a lawsuit. In PAJ, Inc. v. The
Hanover Insurance Co., the Texas Supreme Court held that to deny cov-
erage on this basis, an insurer must show that it was prejudiced by the late
notice.169 According to the supreme court, prejudice is required because
an insured’s obligation to provide timely notice was not “an essential part
of the bargained-for-exchange” under the policy.170
Generally, prejudice is a fact issue. However, some Texas courts have
recognized that situations exist where an insurer can demonstrate that it
is prejudiced as a matter of law by an insured’s failure to provide timely
notice. One such situation is when a notice is not provided until after
entry of judgment against the insured.171
163. Id. at 346.
164. Id. at 347.
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169. PAJ, Inc. v. The Hanover Ins. Co., 243 S.W.3d 630, 631 (Tex. 2008).
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171. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cruz, 883 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam)
(“We agree that an insurer that is not notified of suit against its insured until a default
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The Fifth Circuit again addressed this issue in Nautilus Insurance Co. v.
Miranda-Mondragon, reaffirming that notice provided after a default
judgment constitutes a material breach of an insurance policy and
prejudices an insurer as a matter of law.172 Irma Miranda-Mondragon
(Miranda-Mondragon) was working as a waitress at a nightclub when
gunmen entered and shot her, patrons, and several other employees.173
She sued and subsequently obtained a default judgment against Houston
Star Security Patrol (Houston Star).174 Despite being served, Houston
Star never made an appearance in the lawsuit. Miranda-Mondragon
eventually obtained a default judgment against Houston Star.175 Thereaf-
ter, Miranda-Mondragon sent a letter and a copy of the default judgment
to Houston Star’s insurer, Nautilus Insurance Company (Nautilus), and
demanded payment for the judgment.176
Nautilus filed a declaratory judgment action and obtained summary
judgment that the notice provided was untimely and precluded coverage
under its policy.177 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed, stating: “[t]he
first notice Nautilus received of the lawsuit came from Miranda-Mon-
dragon’s counsel 41 days after the state court entered default judgment
against Houston Star. The delayed notice prejudiced Nautilus as a matter
of law and relieved Nautilus of liability under the policy.”178
C. SUBROGATION
In a matter of first impression, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit evaluated in Associated International Insurance Co. v. Scottsdale
Insurance Co. whether a subrogation clause would “allow an insurer to
seek reformation of a contract between its insured and a third party.”179
Associated International (Associated) was an excess insurer for VDC-
Matthew Ridge, Ltd. (Matthew Ridge).180 Because of an assault on the
premises of a property owned by Matthew Ridge and managed by Alpha-
Barnes Real Estate Services (Alpha), Associated was eventually forced
to contribute to a settlement on behalf of Matthew Ridge and Alpha.181
C.L. Thomas, Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 2014 WL 4494516, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi Sept. 11, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that insurer established prejudice as
matter of law when insured provided notice after arbitration award against it); Wash. Mut.
Bank v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 2010 WL 135685, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi Jan. 14, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (insurer prejudiced as a matter of law due to
insured not providing notice until after judgment); Md. Cas. Co. v. Am. Home Assur. Co.,
277 S.W.3d 107, 118–19 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (holding same).
172. Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Miranda-Mondragon, 711 F. App’x 214, 216 (5th Cir. 2017)
(per curiam).
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Associated sought reimbursement from Scottsdale, which issued an um-
brella policy to Alpha, despite the fact that the property where the assault
occurred was not listed on the schedule of covered properties in the
Scottsdale policy.182
Associated argued that, although the property was not listed as a cov-
ered property on the policy, it had been omitted by mutual mistake be-
tween Alpha and Scottsdale, and thus Associated, as subrogee of Alpha,
had standing to seek reformation of the policy.183 The district court re-
jected Associated’s position, concluding “that Associated had no standing
to seek reformation because it was not in privity with the Alpha-Scotts-
dale ‘agreement.’”184 After outlining the general rationale for allowing
the subrogation of insurers, the Fifth Circuit observed that the district
court erred in holding that Associated was not in privity with the agree-
ment.185 Rather, under the generally accepted principles of subrogation,
Associated stepped into the shoes of Alpha and thus was in privity
through the rights of Alpha.186 The court rejected Scottsdale’s argument
that allowing reformation would run afoul of recognized subrogation
rights under Texas law.187 Rather, Associated sought reformation only as
an avenue to recover amounts it had paid as opposed to a windfall from
its insured. As a result, no equitable basis existed to deny the claim.188
Finally, the court rejected Scottsdale’s argument that reformation would
potentially put Associated at odds with Alpha’s best interest. The court
explained that this argument was unsupportive to Scottsdale’s position,
noting that “an insured’s displeasure with its insurer’s litigation decisions
is a not infrequent consequence of the subrogee getting to step into its
shoes.”189
VI. HOUSE BILL 1774 AND CHAPTER 542A OF THE
TEXAS INSURANCE CODE
During this Survey period, the Texas Legislature passed and Texas
Governor Greg Abbott signed into law House Bill 1774 (the Bill). This
bill addressed multiple insurance-related issues aimed at simplifying first
party liability cases with respect to certain weather-related losses. As a
result of the Bill, Chapter 542A was added to the Texas Insurance Code.
A. SCOPE OF APPLICATION
Chapter 542A codifies certain pre-suit notice and inspection require-
ments and imposes limitations on interest penalties and attorney’s fees.
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insured under an insurance policy providing coverage for real property or
improvements to real property”; (b) “must be paid by the insurer directly
to the insured”; and (c) “arises from damage to or loss of covered prop-
erty caused, wholly or partly, by forces of nature, including an earthquake
or earth tremor, a wildfire, a flood, a tornado, lightning, a hurricane, hail,
wind, a snowstorm, or a rainstorm.”190 These reforms are also limited to
actions against an insurer for “breach of contract . . . negligence, misrep-
resentation, fraud, or breach of a common law duty,” or actions brought
under Subchapter D of Chapter 541, Subchapter B of 542, or Subchapter
E of the DTPA.191
B. LIABILITY FOR AGENTS AND PROPER PARTIES
TO COVERAGE LITIGATION
One significant provision within Chapter 542A relates to liability of
adjusters and other agents. Under the new statute, an “agent”—as de-
fined in the subchapter—may avoid liability if an insurer elects “to accept
whatever liability the agent might have to the claimant for the agent’s
acts or omissions related to the claim.”192 Further, this liability is not
merely limited to adjusters, but may apply to any employee, agent, repre-
sentative, or adjuster who performs any act on behalf of an insurer.
Where an insurer accepts liability on behalf of its agent for acts related to
a claim prior to the filing of a suit, any subsequent suit brought against
that agent will be dismissed with prejudice. Likewise, where an insurer
accepts the agent’s liability after filing of a suit, any action against the
agent will be dismissed. The election cannot be conditioned to allow the
insurer to avoid liability for the agent’s acts, and is irrevocable. Finally, an
insurer’s election to accept the agent’s liability may not be made known
to the jury, and any judgment against the insurer must include any liabil-
ity that would have been assessed against the agent.
We recognized in previous articles that the subject of frequent coverage
litigation is whether a non-diverse defendant (typically the insurance ad-
juster) is improperly joined in an attempt to defeat federal court jurisdic-
tion. The fact-intensive nature of this evaluation led at times to
inconsistent results.193 In light of the passage of the Bill and statutes
promulgated within Chapter 542A, it appears that this issue may be moot
in future storm-related damage litigation.
C. PRE-LITIGATION NOTICE AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS
The Bill also addressed notice requirements for filing suit against an
insurer. Specifically, not later than the sixty first day prior to the filing of
190. TEX. INS. CODE § 542A.001 (West Supp. 2017).
191. Id. § 542A.002.
192. Id. § 542A.006.
193. See generally J. Price Collins et. al., Insurance Law, 2 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 199
(2016).
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a lawsuit, a claimant must give written notice to its insurer specifically
identifying:
• “[T]he acts or omissions giving rise to the claim”;
• The amount allegedly owed by the insurer; and
• “[T]he amount of reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees . . . cal-
culated by multiplying the number of hours actually worked by
claimant’s attorney . . . by an hourly rate that is customary for simi-
lar legal services.”194
The notice is admissible as evidence in a civil action, but may not be re-
quired where doing so would cause the claim to be barred under the stat-
ute of limitations. An insurer who receives pre-suit notice may request an
inspection of the property at issue within thirty days of receipt of the
notice. Such an inspection should be completed not later than sixty days
after receipt of the pre-suit notice.195
Under Chapter 542A, insurers may file a plea in abatement within
thirty days of filing an original answer where pre-suit notice was either
not received or pre-suit inspection was requested but no reasonable op-
portunity to inspect was provided.196 Absent a response affidavit by the
insured, the suit will be automatically abated without a court order eleven
days after the filing of a verified plea and abatement will continue until
either the sixtieth day after proper pre-suit notice is given or the fifteenth
day after the requested property inspection is completed, whichever is
later.197
Significantly, the Texas Legislature also took steps to reign in the
award of attorney’s fees for first party cases. For instance, where a defen-
dant pleads and proves that pre-suit notice was not properly given, the
court may not award attorney’s fees to the claimant incurred after the
date the defendant files its pleading with the court.198
Likewise, where such notice is proven to be unreasonably inflated, a
court may limit attorney’s fees. If less than twenty percent of claimed pre-
suit damages are awarded, no fees are recoverable. If the amount
awarded is between twenty and seventy-nine percent of claimed pre-suit
damages, a corresponding percentage of attorney’s fees is likewise recov-
erable. If eighty percent or more are recovered, full recovery of attor-
ney’s fees is permissible.199 These limiting provisions do not apply in the
event an insurer accepts liability on behalf of an agent but fails to reason-
ably make the agent available for deposition testimony, unless a court
subsequently determines that it was impracticable to make the agent
available for testimony, or the agent would not have been a proper party
to the action, or their testimony was not warranted under the law.
194. TEX. INS. CODE § 542A.003 (West Supp. 2017).
195. Id. § 542A.004.
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D. PENALTY INTEREST FOR PROMPT PAYMENT VIOLATIONS
Finally, Chapter 542A amends Texas Insurance Code § 542.060 to pro-
vide a new calculation for statutory penalty interest for prompt payment
violations.200 Specifically, in an action where Chapter 542A applies, pen-
alty interest will now be determined by adding five percent to the Federal
Reserve’s prime rate, down to a floor of five percent and up to a ceiling
of fifteen percent. In other words, where the prime rate drops below five
percent, penalty interest will be calculated by adding five percent to a
base of five percent, for a minimum penalty interest of ten percent.
Where the prime rate rises about fifteen percent, fifteen percent will be
used instead of the prime rate for a maximum penalty interest of twenty
percent. This new rate will only apply to claims made after September 1,
2017.
200. Id. § 542.060(c).
